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ABSTRACT
This Article explains that the application of anti-money
laundering
(AML)
regulation,
supervision,
and
enforcement is relevant to financial inclusion, but is not, in
itself, necessarily determinative of the success or failure of
financial inclusion initiatives or their impact on economic
growth. Successful payments system innovation,
particularly payment tools targeting underserved markets,
requires effective entrepreneurship operating in an
environment of good governance and rational economic
policies. AML safeguards help to deter corruption and
other forms of financial crime, which helps to establish and
maintain economic stability and preserve the rule of law,
creating a supportive environment for innovation and
*

Emery S. Kobor is the assistant director for strategic policy in the Office
of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes at the U.S. Department of the
Treasury and is a member of the U.S. delegation to the Financial Action Task
Force. Prior to joining the Department of the Treasury, he worked as a
consultant advising corporate treasurers on payment and risk management
strategies and was a senior research analyst for the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago’s Payments Studies Group. Kobor earned an MBA degree in finance
from George Washington University and an undergraduate degree from
Vanderbilt University.
I would like to thank my colleagues Anne Larson, Mark Poncy, and Anne
Wallwork for reviewing my remarks and providing helpful comments.
This Article was presented as the keynote speech at the Mobile Money in
Developing Countries: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity Conference
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financial inclusion. This Article explains that the revised
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations,
the international standard for AML practices, promote a
risk-based approach to implementation, allowing countries
flexibility in order to encourage the widest possible
participation in the regulated and supervised financial
system.
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INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to be here today and for that honor, I want to
thank Louis de Koker, whom I met several years ago when we
were both speaking at a conference in Kuala Lumpur. I remember
that event vividly because we gave multiple presentations over
several days – something like a repertory company. I recalled that
experience in preparing for today’s remarks. It occurred to me that,
in order to discuss how anti-money laundering (AML) regulations
apply to new payment methods that are used to spur financial
inclusion and boost economic development, one must, in effect,
give four presentations. Not only do payments innovation,
financial inclusion, economic development, and AML regulation
each deserve special attention, but how each influences and is
influenced by the public and private sectors is also relevant.
Consider:


The engine of innovation is private-sector ingenuity and the
pursuit of profit. The public sector’s role in supporting
payments system innovation, at the most basic level, is to
allow for the accumulation of private property; protect
property rights, including intellectual property, by
upholding the rule of law; facilitate access to capital; and
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permit competition to take place, while maintaining an
open and stable economy.


Entrepreneurs will reach out to the unbanked where it
makes economic sense to do so. The unbanked will be
responsive, provided their use of cash and unlicensed
financial services are not a reaction to poor governance and
inadequate economic policies. But any firm willing to
invest in developing an untapped market is going to want as
big a share of the potential profits as possible, which means
a firm willing to move first will seek to erect barriers to
competition. The public sector and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) fostering financial inclusion may
seek to remove those barriers in the belief that more
competition right away means greater financial access.
Failure to coordinate public and private sector goals will
ultimately impede financial inclusion.



The pillars of economic development include
macroeconomic stability, infrastructure development, and
good governance, including promoting the rule of law. An
unfriendly business environment—including endemic
corruption and counterproductive monetary and fiscal
policies—impedes growth and drives economic activity
underground, which erodes the tax base worsening publicsector budget constraints and restricting government
programs and policies intended to foster the basic
conditions for further growth.



Excessive regulation, including AML regulation, is a
burden to business and a barrier to economic growth. But
the rule of law and proportional regulation, particularly as it
pertains to AML safeguards, deters corruption, enhances
transparency, and facilitates international cooperation,
which creates a supportive business environment.

That is a very quick overview of how payment systems
innovation, financial inclusion, economic development, and
financial regulation interact. Now I would like to look at each in a
little more depth.
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I. PAYMENT SYSTEMS INNOVATION
Almost ten years ago, I co-authored a paper at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago titled Why Invest in Payment
Innovations? 1 The title was not intended to be ironic. The paper
was written to help financial services providers identify the
appropriate strategy when investing in new payment methods. At
the time, the focus was on how to leverage the Internet to extend
payment options. Today, the focus is on mobile payments. But it is
still a challenge for the private sector to know when to pursue
customer acquisition versus customer retention, or to emphasize
cutting costs versus boosting revenues.
The right private-sector strategy is based in part on where a
company wants to be on what I refer to as the “innovation
timeline.” To be the first to introduce a new payment method to the
market involves taking a big risk, but opens up the possibility of
big returns and locking in new customers if the strategy is
successful. Taking the opposite approach and moving slowly can
also be a big risk, but if fast-moving competitors stumble, their
costly mistakes offer valuable lessons to the rest of the market.
Even when the firm that acts first to establish a market is
successful, other firms still have important strategic decisions to
make as to how fast or how slowly they choose to follow, and how
or whether they differentiate their services.
The innovation timeline starts when a company introduces a
new payment method, ideally tapping into latent demand and a
new source of profits. For taking the risk and making the
investment to establish the market, a first mover will seek a high
profit margin and will attempt to hold back competitors for as long
as possible, often using proprietary technology and intellectual
property protections. As competitors eventually enter the market,
competition will gradually erode the advantage the first mover
enjoyed, lowering prices and broadening market access over time.
But that scenario, in which a single company blazes a bold trail
to a successful new market, is rare. More often many companies
1

Sujit Chakravorti & Emery Kobor, Why Invest in Payment Innovations?,
1 J. PAYMENT SYS. L. 331 (2005).
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attempt a number of strategies and more-or-less manage to find
their way to a viable market. There is always uncertainty. The
mobile payments initiatives currently struggling throughout the
developing world demonstrate that the need for financial inclusion
and the ubiquity of cell phones do not, by themselves, easily
translate into profitable demand for mobile payments.
Safaricom’s M-PESA mobile payment service in Kenya stands
out precisely because of the rarity of its success. There have been a
number of studies comparing M-PESA with similar services
elsewhere, including M-PESA in Tanzania; 2 various mobile money
providers in Ghana; 3 and in the Philippines. 4 The common
deficiencies cited by these studies include ineffective marketing,
inadequate distribution channels, and a failure to address countryspecific demand characteristics.
Harvard Business School recently introduced a case study
comparing M-PESA in Kenya with the mobile payments company
WIZZIT in South Africa. 5 The case study emphasizes that profits
are earned by delivering what the customer wants, not what the
service provider thinks the customer needs. More broadly, the case
study illustrates that each component of a successful strategy is
important, including how the company is capitalized, the
marketing plan, and the distribution network. M-PESA is
successful in part because the company focused narrowly on
2

Gunnar Camner & Emil Sjöblom, Can the Success of M-PESA be
Repeated? – A Review of the Implementations in Kenya and Tanzania,
VALUABLE BITS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.mobileactive.org/files/
file_uploads/camner_sjoblom_differences_ke_tz.pdf.
3
Edwin Mensah, Ubiquitous Technology, Untapped Benefits: Is Mobile
Money Technology Destined for Oblivion in Ghana?, USAID MICROLINKS
BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://microlinks.kdid.org/blogs/ubiquitoustechnology-untapped-benefits-mobile-money-technology-destined-oblivionghana.
4
Mark Pickens, Window on the Unbanked: Mobile Money in the
Philippines (Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor, Brief, 2009), available at
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.41163/BR_Mobile_Money_
Philippines.pdf.
5
V. Kasturi Rangan & Katharine Lee, Mobile Banking for the Unbanked
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Mktg. Unit, Case No. 511-049, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017994.
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providing a convenient and cost-effective way for Kenyans to send
money domestically from urban areas to family members in rural
communities. WIZZIT saw its role as providing a full suite of
banking services to the unbanked in South Africa without regard
for market demand. The Harvard case study concludes that
WIZZIT, in addition to overreaching strategically, made less than
optimal decisions regarding capitalization, marketing, and
distribution.
II. FINANCIAL INCLUSION
For a mobile payments initiative to be a successful financial
inclusion tool, it has to be a viable business. But government and
civil society may be able to help influence the market’s rate of
adopting a new payment method by changing how they pay
salaries and conduct transactions. NGOs, development banks, and
bilateral development partners may be able to introduce mobile
payments or other electronic payment methods as part of relief
initiatives. If coordinated with private-sector participants, these
initiatives can promote financial inclusion.
More important than fostering the adoption of a product,
however, is helping to develop a receptive market. Potential
barriers to financial inclusion include market disruptions caused by
armed conflict, extreme poverty, and natural disasters. Inadequate
government infrastructure—including a lack of government-issued
identification—as well as illiteracy, lawlessness, and wellestablished networks of unlicensed payment service providers also
handicap financial inclusion initiatives.
Market demand for an alternative payment method is a
function of need and experience. Need is influenced by the extent
to which there is a supply of financial service providers, whether or
not they operate legally. Experience is influenced by price
volatility, opportunities for tax evasion, foreign exchange
restrictions, corruption, and financial illiteracy, all of which can
drive consumers and businesses to prefer cash.
In addition to promoting good governance and economic
stability, government can help ease the cost to the private sector of
marketing new payment initiatives by promoting literacy and
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financial education, and providing incentives to help foster the
transition to electronic payments.
III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Financial inclusion is one facet of economic development, and
financial inclusion itself has many facets beyond facilitating
transactions. For example, giving the poor an alternative to cash
that allows them to hold what money they have with a service
provider for safekeeping has the effect of mobilizing capital. In
Kibera, a slum in Nairobi that is home to hundreds of thousands of
people who, remarkably, have electricity but very little else, I saw
a surprising number of M-PESA agents. For the residents of
Kibera, using M-PESA can reduce crime and help facilitate the
accumulation of savings. My observations are consistent with the
results of a recent study of the effects of M-PESA in Kenya, which
concluded that M-PESA is helping to expand local economies,
enhance security, help people to accumulate capital, and make
transactions easier. 6
There is a limit, however, to what can be accomplished without
financial transparency, effective governance, and the rule of law.
Serious development challenges remain in Africa, where,
according to the World Bank, almost half the population lives on
US$1.25 a day, and governance and transparency remain weak. 7
There is an understanding in Kenya of the importance of good
governance and transparency to economic development. The
country’s development plan, Kenya Vision 2030, states: “One of
the most urgent steps towards creating a competitive financial
environment in Kenya is introducing legal and institutional reforms
that will enhance transparency in all transactions, build trust and
make enforcement of justice more efficient.” 8 However, Kenya’s
6

MEGAN G. PLYLER ET AL., COMMUNITY-LEVEL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
M-PESA IN KENYA: INITIAL FINDINGS 40 (2010), available at
http://www.fsassessment.umd.edu/publications/pdfs/Community-EffectsMPESA-Kenya.pdf.
7
Africa Regional Brief, THE WORLD BANK (March 2012), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/3IGKDWFTG1.
8
GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, KENYA VISION 2030 – THE POPULAR
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slow progress on financial transparency, combating corruption, and
affirming the rule of law may jeopardize the gains M-PESA has
achieved.
Corruption is most prevalent and damaging where it
compounds other forms of institutional inefficiency, such as
political instability, bureaucratic red tape, and weak legislative and
judicial systems. Research by the International Monetary Fund
shows corruption reduces economic growth primarily by
discouraging private investment. 9 Poor monetary and fiscal
policies also hurt economic growth by inadvertently encouraging
consumers and entrepreneurs to use cash and transact in the
underground economy. The Council of Europe estimates the
underground economy accounts for as much as two-thirds of gross
domestic product in some Central and East European countries
where, as they put it, “the rule of law is still fragile.” 10 Zimbabwe
gave up on monetary policy in 2009, adopting the U.S. dollar
instead. But the memory of crushing inflation is keeping people
away from banks and alternatives to cash, putting a brake on
economic growth. 11 Argentina, Greece, Italy, Nigeria, Russia, and
Tanzania are struggling to reduce the use of cash through
regulation in order to mitigate capital flight, financial crime, and
tax evasion. However, in countries with inadequate regulation,
supervision, and enforcement, electronic transactions are more
efficient for both licit and illicit transactions.
IV. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
The ease with which money moves around the world today
VERSION 15 (2007).
9
Paolo Mauro, Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for
Further Research, FIN. & DEV. (Int’l Monetary Fund), March 1998, at 11, 12,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/mauro.pdf.
10
EUR. PARL. ASS., The Underground Economy: A Threat to Democracy,
Development and the Rule of Law, Res. 1847 (2011), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileId=18056&Languag
e=EN.
11
Patrick McGroarty & Farai Mutsaka, Hanging On to Dollars In
Zimbabwe, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702303812904577297501999130154.html.
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makes it seem that every major financial crime now is an
international crime. The U.S. Department of the Treasury was
reconfigured in 2004 to better deal with the challenges of money
laundering and terrorist financing, which have become increasingly
more complicated. The creation of the Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence (TFI), where I work, signaled a new era for
finance ministries globally. TFI includes an intelligence
component and has enforcement, policy, and regulatory authorities.
TFI works to establish, support, and enforce best practices against
money laundering and terrorist financing domestically, bilaterally,
and through multilateral bodies, including the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF).
Established by the G-7 Economic Summit in 1989, the FATF is
acknowledged by the G-20, International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and United Nations to be the global standard-setter for antimoney laundering and counter terrorist financing policies and
procedures (AML/CFT). The FATF includes 36 12 members,
representing most major financial centers in all parts of the globe.
In addition to setting AML/CFT standards, the FATF promotes and
assesses compliance and, when necessary, coordinates diplomatic
pressure and countermeasures through its member governments.
Through a combination of technical expertise and political and
economic strength, the FATF has been unique among international
bodies in its ability to take strong, effective multilateral action to
prompt positive change in strengthening jurisdictional AML/CFT
regimes worldwide.
The FATF recently revised its Recommendations. Originally
there were 40 AML Recommendations. After September 11, the
FATF adopted nine special recommendations to address terrorist
financing. As part of the revision this year, some recommendations
were combined or dropped, some added, resulting once again in 40
12

The FATF members include: Argentina; Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Gulf Cooperation Council, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian
Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Recommendations, with no special recommendations. The FATF
40 Recommendations now cover money laundering, terrorist
financing, and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
The Recommendations are clustered into seven categories, with
the first two Recommendations making up the first category. The
new Recommendation 1 calls on countries to undertake a national
risk assessment to understand the money laundering and terrorist
financing risks in the country. A guidance paper is being prepared
to help countries conduct their first risk assessment.
Recommendation 2 calls for national risk-based AML/CFT
policies, responsive to the risk assessment.
Recommendations 3 and 4 address criminalizing money
laundering and facilitating the forfeiture of illicit assets. The next
group, Recommendations 5-8, addresses the financing of terrorism
and WMD proliferation, including the implementation of relevant
sanctions in United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The preventative measures, Recommendations 9-23, are the
standards most closely associated with the FATF and most directly
tied to discussions of regulatory costs, economic growth, and
financial inclusion. These Recommendations include the customer
identification and recordkeeping obligations, as well as
requirements for filing suspicious transaction reports and
conducting enhanced due diligence when opening an account for a
foreign political figure or their family members.
Recommendations 24 and 25 concern the registration of legal
entities and opening an account for a legal entity at a financial
institution, and the requirement in both processes to understand
who owns or controls the entity—so-called beneficial ownership.
Recommendations 26-35 address supervision of financial
institutions, the role and responsibilities of law enforcement, and
the role of financial intelligence units.
The final category, Recommendations 36-40, addresses
international cooperation, including requirements to implement
four international conventions. 13 These Recommendations include
13

“The Vienna Convention, 1988; the Palermo Convention, 2000; the
United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003; and the Terrorist
Financing Convention, 1999.” FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL
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criteria addressing cross-border cooperation for civil and criminal
investigations, the freezing and confiscation of assets, extradition,
and cooperation among supervisory authorities.
The FATF is working on a new methodology for the mutual
evaluation
process
to
assess
compliance with
the
Recommendations. Previously, the assessment process was
detailed, technical, and lengthy, and produced detailed, technical,
and lengthy reports. The goal of the new methodology is to assess
the effectiveness of the implementation of the standards rather than
rate technical compliance, and in doing so, hopefully, the next
round of mutual evaluation reports will be less technical and much
shorter.
Exactly what criteria the FATF will use to measure effective
implementation is the subject of ongoing lengthy discussions. It is
hoped that emphasizing effective compliance with the FATF
Recommendations will help to provide the financial transparency
necessary to deter corruption, assist law enforcement, and maintain
the rule of law not only at home, but globally through international
cooperation. Poor laws and inadequate enforcement provide little
capacity to support neighbors seeking help in conducting criminal
investigations, identifying stolen assets, or deterring terrorist
financing. A country that demonstrates an unwillingness to address
significant gaps in its AML/CFT regime opens its borders to a
cross-flow of illicit assets, weakening the anti-corruption and
AML/CFT efforts of other countries.
Flexibility is built into many of the Recommendations,
allowing countries to take a risk-based approach to
implementation. The FATF has published guidance papers that
illustrate how to apply a risk-based approach. But a review of the
FATF mutual evaluations that were completed between 2005 and
2011 indicates that few countries attempted to assess the risks they
were trying to address and apply the FATF Recommendations
STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 27 (2012),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/
pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20(approved%20February%202012)%20rep
rint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf.
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accordingly. Most countries took a uniform approach, mandating
the same obligations of all financial institutions, regardless of
product or customer. This strategy can hamper financial inclusion
efforts involving small-scale, low-risk financial services providers.
One reason why the risk-based approach has not yet been
widely embraced is because it is not well understood. Most
countries have not attempted a systematic risk assessment, and
many will find it challenging. Where governance is weak, there
will be few civil or criminal enforcement actions or suspicious
transaction reports filed by financial institutions to help policy
makers understand the underlying threats. However, a risk
assessment does not have to be retrospective, especially regarding
new payments initiatives fostering financial inclusion. Establishing
usage limits such as a balance, deposit, or withdrawal cap and
transaction limits, with effective ongoing transaction monitoring, is
one way to limit risk by design.
I often hear that the FATF customer identification and
recordkeeping obligations can be too burdensome for developing
countries, especially those exploring financial inclusion initiatives
using mobile payments or other new payments methods. But in
fact, customer identification and transaction recordkeeping are
essential to the private sector to inform marketing decisions, help
prevent fraud, and protect consumers. An important benefit MPESA has enjoyed in Kenya is the availability of governmentissued identification for citizens over the age of eighteen.
Accommodating non-traditional financial service providers,
particularly non-banks offering account-based services, within the
regulated financial system can be difficult for many countries. The
traditional regulatory framework divides financial services
providers into those that offer account-based or transaction-based
services, with banks on one side and money or value transfer
services on the other. Allowing account-based financial services to
be offered by businesses that are not regulated as banks can extend
the physical reach of the formal financial system, but requires a
new approach to regulation that applies safeguards on the basis of
potential risk. One way to reduce risk and allow for a reduced
regulatory burden is for non-traditional financial services providers
to cap account and transaction value or deposit and withdrawal
value and frequency.
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A different challenge for many countries is limited resources
for supervision, examination, and enforcement. If a country has
only a small cadre of trained bank examiners and the central bank
can barely account for the depository institutions in the country, it
is daunting and potentially dangerous to open the financial system
to additional service providers without adequate oversight or
without limiting the potential risk. Defining the parameters of what
is acceptable for businesses operating as financial services
providers can help to reduce the risk and help countries become
comfortable with allowing nontraditional service providers into the
market.
The tools to foster economic development are not at odds with
AML/CFT policies and procedures, and in fact are mutually
reinforcing. The challenge for developing countries is to ensure
that financial inclusion efforts involving new payment methods
include appropriate risk-based AML/CFT safeguards, rather than
assuming these efforts can be sequenced. It is misguided to start
implementing new financial services now and follow with
regulation and supervision at some point in the future. A better
approach is to apply appropriate safeguards, given the potential
risks. A mobile payments initiative offered through a mobile
network operator that provides the unbanked a limited purpose
account arguably could present a lower money laundering and
terrorist financing risk than the status quo, if the status quo means
a large unbanked population, transacting in cash, using unlicensed
money transmitters.
CONCLUSION
In an increasingly interconnected world, our interests are
inextricably bound to the interests of those beyond our borders. A
few years ago, when Gordon Brown was still Chancellor of the
Exchequer in the United Kingdom before becoming Prime
Minister, he said: “There is a paradox about globalization: the very
opportunities it offers—the free movement of money, people,
goods and information—are harnessed by terrorists and organised
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criminals.” 14 Brown’s observation is a good reminder that as we
seek to channel the benefits of technological and geopolitical
change to increase access to economic opportunity, we must also
work to limit opportunities for corruption, financial crime, and
terrorism. The FATF Recommendations are above all intended to
establish a common defense against financial crime, and
encouraging financial inclusion supports that effort.

14

Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Securing Our Future,
Speech at the Royal United Services Institute (Feb. 13, 2006), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
newsroom_and_speeches/speeches/chancellorexchequer/speech_chex_130206.c
fm.

